It has been obvious for a while that the 2006 season is a complete disaster for the Pirates. The club's strategy of mixing their young starting pitchers with some Proven Veteran hitters produced predictable results – the pitchers look young and the hitters look old. The failures of 2006 extend from the field – where the Pirates were already expected to struggle – to the PR department. A major off season story was the potential increase in payroll promised by the McClatchy ownership group, a move that was supposed to improve the team by filling some of the more obvious holes such as first base and right field via free agency. To that extent, the Pirates made four major (by Bucco standards) acquisitions: trading Dave Williams for Sean Casey, and signing Jeromy Burnitz, Roberto Hernandez, and Joe Randa as free agents.

None of the moves was considered a long-term solution; Pirates management publicly reasoned that they didn't want any of the older players to potentially block the "prospects" in the farm system. All four players were basically acquired on a one-year trial basis, and even in spring training it looked like Casey was the only one the team was interested in signing past 2006 (Burnitz has a $750,000 buyout for 2007).

In hindsight, the money was poorly spent. Burnitz and Randa both played worse than last season, which was expected given their age. Casey spent a lot of time injured, and spent the rest of the time being Sean Casey – which is to say an o.k. hitter with almost no power. Hernandez pitched well enough, but he represented a $2.75 million investment in an already successful bullpen.

There are many ways to interpret the big moves of the off season. Some might say that it is another sign that teams like the Bucs can't compete in baseball's economic environment. I fully expect ownership to take a typical el-cheapo stance: "We spent nearly $50 million and finished last; we could 'go with youth' and do the same for $20 million." In my opinion, the moves shed light on a few issues, and hopefully I can detail them all before you click off of this site. Before delving too much into who the Pirates could have acquired instead of their ancient foursome, I want to propose some free agency tenets and dispel some myths.

Myth One: The Pirates Can't Afford to Pay Big-Name Talent.

In the ongoing battle between small market and big market teams, the small market guys always complain that they can't sign the best players. While teams like the Yanks and Red Sox have more money to throw around than the Bucs, it doesn't mean that the lower payroll teams have to scrounge for table scraps. Here is a list of the ten highest paid free agents from last season:

Player Age Years

Paul Konerko, 1B 30 5 $60,000,000

Kevin Millwood, SP 31 5 $60,000,000

A.J. Burnett, SP 29 5 $55,000,000

Johnny Damon, CF 32 4 $52,000,000

Hideki Matsui, LF 32 4 $52,000,000

B.J. Ryan, RP 30 5 $47,000,000

Billy Wagner, RP 35 4 $43,000,000

Rafael Furcal, SS 28 3 $39,000,000

Jarrod Washburn, SP 31 4 $37,500,000

Brian Giles, RF 35 3 $30,000,000.

All of the deals range from 3-5 years and $10-$13 million per season. None of these players are elite, but all are capable of being at least above average. The upcoming free agency crop includes big names like Soriano and Zito, guys who will command $15-$20 million per season. With their $20 million, the Pirates could have added two players from the above list or added a superstar like Soriano. Instead, they added four overpaid bums.

Having the money to pay bigger names does not make it smart for any team, especially a team like the Pirates (I do believe that they have some financial constraints, but they are exaggerated by the ownership), to offer some of the above contracts. Konerko is probably too old for the Pirates to commit to five years, and the Blue Jays were foolish to spend so much on the injury-prone Burnett. But my point remains: the Pirates could have signed two Konerko-level players last season. The market for major leaguers is well-established, and getting a free agent first baseman with power (or an above-average starter) costs around $10-$12 million per season for a minimum of three years.Damaso Marte (10), Victor Santos (11), Saloman Torres (12), and John Grabow (13) aren’t quite down the Wells road (especially since two of them are relatively new Bucs), but they’re underachieving or underwhelming at best. Truth is, ain’t nobody gonna want ‘em for more than a bag of balls.

Myth Two: Players won't come to Pittsburgh!

A common addition to the previous argument is that players either won't come to Pittsburgh or that the Pirates need to pay a premium to acquire good players. Wrong. Players are guided by agents, men with dollar signs in their eyes. Players therefore go where they can find the money, be it Pittsburgh, New York, or Green Bay. (Oddly enough, you rarely hear this argument against the Steelers.) Surely, Burnett and BJ Ryan didn't sign with the Blue Jays because of their winning reputation of finishing third for nine consecutive seasons.

There are definitely some exceptions to my claim. For example, it probably would have taken a significantly better offer than 5 years, $60 million to lure Paul Konerko to Pittsburgh. Then again, Konerko just won the World Series with the White Sox and had a chance to both cash in and repeat. And there are some players who really won't come to Pittsburgh, notably Bill Mueller last winter. This is likely not the norm, despite Bob Smizik's claims to the contrary. Building and fielding a winning team would help convince the remaining doubters.

Myth Three: You can build a lasting, successful team through free agency.

With the exception of the mega-spending Yankees, successful major league teams are built through the farm system (or trades, which is basically taking from someone else's farm system). As the Yankees illustrate, building a team largely via free agency creates a team that is both expensive and relatively old. This happens for a few reasons. First, most major leaguers can't become free agents until after their sixth year in the big leagues. This means that the youngest free agents any year will be 28 or 29, and many guys will be over 30 and on the downside of their careers. Second, free agents are slightly overvalued relative to younger players. You can blame this on the promise (or illusion) of consistency – the White Sox had a good idea how Jim Thome would produce for the next few years, and decided to pay more for his services than the Phillies currently pay for Thome's replacement, Ryan Howard. Howard might hit more homers over the next three years, but while the Sox could be relatively confident in Thome hitting 35-40 every year. Before this season, Howard didn't have any track record. (And yes, I know that Thome was acquired via trade.)

For a team like the Pirates, free agency provides a venue to improve the parts of the team that are deficient. Entering the 2006 season, the Pirates looked set in left and center field (Bay and Duffy), they had several starters awaiting a real chance in the majors (Duke, Maholm, Snell, and ultimately Gorzelanny), and a few other players worth taking another look at (Sanchez and Castillo, to name two). The obvious need was for a first baseman or right fielder with power, preferably one who hits left-handed. The secondary need was for a third baseman.

The logical course of action was to apply the bulk of the spending power (the $20 million) filling the two most pressing needs, and the Pirates did this to some extent. But why waste almost $3 million on another relief pitcher in Hernandez, when right handed relievers are about the only type of player the Bucs seem capable of developing?

Myth Four: Free Agents are one-year fixes, not long-term investments.

Looking again at the list of free agents, it is easy to see one of the big differences between those contracts and the deals made with Randa (1 year), Burnitz (1 year), and Hernandez (1 year). The Pirates have established a habit of signing free agents to one year deals, and there is certainly an aspect of PR in this strategy. Every winter, the Bucs can announce their latest signing, the next veteran who will come in and help guide the young hitters. Of course, there are some major flaws with only awarding one year deals.

First and foremost, there are only two types of players looking for one year contracts: guys who are over the hill and just trying to catch on somewhere (Burnitz), and guys who are trying to prove that their recent string of injuries is over (I-Rod in 2003 with the Marlins, Nomar this season). The Pirates typically opt for the former, which means that their "big free agents" are almost always bound to disappoint, in large part because their best seasons came five or seven years ago. The ownership claims it tries to minimize risk by signing one year deals (they can jettison Randa instead of having Burnett for four more years and $44 million), but by pursuing this strategy they are always acquiring the highest risk players!

The one year contracts also send a strong message to the fans that the player will be gone by the trading deadline. While this may help the bottom line – moving a player by the end of July saves the team from paying about a third of the contract – it does little to help either the team or the return value in a trade. Consider the case of reasonably priced Kip Wells ($4.15 million in 2006), who becomes a free agent after this season. Before the 2005 season, he was mentioned in trade talks involving Ryan Howard. Before this season, the Bucs and Rangers haggled whether he was worth Hank Blalock or Kevin Mench. When he was finally traded at the deadline, the Pirates received a minor leaguer.

The lesson is simple: While overpriced players are hard to move, reasonably priced players can be traded easily. But the return value decreases as the player nears free agency and the amount of time he can contribute to his new team shrinks. When the Phillies could have acquired Wells for two years, he was worth their top prospect, but he is significantly less valuable as a two month rental for the Rangers.

Sooooo....who COULD the Pirates have added?

Burnitz/Casey/Randa/Hernandez did not improve the team. Who could the Pirates have acquired instead? With the benefit of hindsight, I will offer a few different, and likely more effective, ways that Dave Littlefield could have spent his $20 million on free agents. I will contend that the below average performance of Casey, Randa, and Burnitz was predictable based on their histories, and that the Pirates could have acquired better players for the same price. In this exercise I am essentially treating the Casey trade as a free agent signing, primarily because by adding Casey the Pirates increased their payroll.

One of my major assumptions is that the salary increase to $50 million is permanent, which we all know might not be the case in reality. While the average major league team payroll has steadily increased over the past decade, the Bucco payroll has fluctuated from around $10 million in 1997 to almost $60 million in 2001. Admittedly, this assumption may be poor, but I can't predict the 2007 payroll without a crystal ball.

The ground rules are simple: 1. Spend $20 million on free agents that address the team's needs, and improve the team. I will follow actual 2006 free agent signings as a guide; for example, Paul Konerko will cost me $60 million over 5 years. I can't sign him for $36 million over three years. 2. I can't predict trades that didn't happen (so no Perez for Blalock), but I can undo trades. I would never trade for Sean Casey. 3. The payroll for 2006 is around $50 million and slightly more for 2007, so I won't have to make a 2003-type salary dump. 4. I ignore the trades made at the 2006 deadline, because they were influenced by the off season. I can't trade Casey away if I never acquire him in the first place.

And to review, the team needs are: 1. A first baseman or right fielder with power, preferably who hits left handed. 2. A third baseman. 3. A starting pitcher, especially one who will eat innings.

Scenario 1: Paul Konerko, 5 years, $60 million and Matt Morris, 3 years, $27 million

I know, I already said that the Pirates probably couldn't get Konerko and that five years was too long. But I also stated that the market dictates that players like Konerko cost around $10-$12 million per season, and Konerko is exactly what the Pirates need. Instead of trading for the overpriced Casey, there might have existed a case where the Pirates could have managed to acquire a player similar to Konerko. So maybe they couldn't sign him specifically, but imagine what it would be like to have a player with 27 homers (through 8/10) hitting behind Jason Bay.

Morris is no longer an ace, but he is on pace to pitch over 200 innings and averages over 6 innings per start. With the young starters making so many early exits, getting 30 starts out of Morris would help the bullpen rest.

Scenario 2: Morris; Jacque Jones, 3 years, $16 million; Eric Byrnes, 1 year, $2.25 million

Jones is left handed and plays right field. He is hitting .285/.318/.493, which gives him an OPS that is slightly above average for his position. He is surely helped by playing at Wrigley Field, so we might expect a slightly lower slugging percentage if he played at PNC. An alternative to Jones could be Juan Encarnacion (3 years, $15 million), who is a similar player with slightly lower power numbers and who is a year younger. For comparison to Jones, consider that the Pirates started the season with Jeromy Burnitz and his .234/.287/.442 line.

The Pirates have shown interest in Byrnes in the past, and I am surprised that they didn't sign him for the bargain price of $2.25 million. He would have made a good fourth outfielder and been a good insurance policy for the Chris Duffy meltdown.

Scenario 3: Jones, Byrnes, and Nomar (1 year, $6 million) and 3a: Morris, Nomar, Byrnes

If you're going to take a one year flyer for $6 million, would you rather have someone who is 37 and strikeout prone or someone who is 33 and a former batting champion with power? Maybe the Pirates were too fixated on the idea of grabbing a lefty.

Scenario 4: Take one or none of the players listed above, and save the money for next year

The Pirates backed themselves into a corner regarding free agents and team salary this season. The Pirates failed to raise payroll, as promised, in 2005; this made it imperative for Littlefield to spend his entire budget in 2006. Unfortunately, he did so in a lean year for free agents, and in the process of wasting money on Burnitz/Randa/Casey/Hernandez he blocked Eldred and Bautista in the minors. While saving the money would have made the Pirates look cheaper than ever, it might have been the best course of action. Next season's free agent crop is better, and even after years of testing out 'youth' the Pirates still had major questions about some of their young players entering 2006.

As much as it would have pained the fans, the Pirates could have tested out Eldred and Bautista at the major league level instead of wasting at bats on Randa and Casey. In fact, many fans would have probably appreciated the move.

For my money, I prefer scenario 5:

Scenario 5: Jones and Byrnes; start Bautista and Eldred in the majors; save about $13 million for 2007

My opening day lineup would include Jones as the starting right fielder and Duffy in center. Byrnes and Craig Wilson would be outfielders 4a and 4b, with Wilson also backing up at first. I would like for one of them to bat left-handed, but I'm not going to waste $6 million on a Burnitz to make it happen. Eldred would start at first, and Bautista at third. Freddy Sanchez would be my reserve infielder – it seems silly given his success this season, but in my world Freddy still gets to play either when Duffy implodes or when someone realizes that Jack Wilson has a sub-.400 slugging percentage. I would put the $13 million left over towards acquiring someone like Carlos Lee, who can protect Bay and provide a lot of power, in 2007.

The aftermath

I had a few goals in this article. One was to once again highlight how bad the Pirates are at assembling a winning team, assuming that it is one of the organization's goals. Building a winning team is not rocket science, and it is not the result of some sort of voodoo. Concocting a winning yet cheap team is difficult, but not impossible.

None of the scenarios presented above would have made the Buccos winners in 2006. The team would still have major flaws: the Duffy fiasco, the potential injury to Eldred, and the poor performance by the young starters to name a few. Any of the scenarios would have improved the Pirates and put them in a better standing heading into 2007. In fact, doing nothing would have been better than what they did.

Consistently making intelligent decisions, including signing productive players at reasonable cost, could eventually make the Pirates a viable team. Of course, we have to ask ourselves if this is an actual goal. As many have discussed, the McClatchy ownership group appears to be motivated by other means. The situation will not improve until either the attitude or the owners change.

----Dr. Burgher

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